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A Sober Second Look at Appellations of
Origin: How the United States Will
Crash France's Wine and Cheese Party
Jim Chen*
France regulates the production methods of certain fine
foods and beverages through appellations of controlled origin, or
appellations d'origine contr6lde (AOCs).' The AOC system re-
stricts the right to produce select wines and cheeses to a desig-
nated geographic region associated with those foods. Sparkling
wine from Champagne and Roquefort cheese are but two cele-
brated examples. French law ensures localized control of AOC-
regulated products by requiring them to be processed in the
same region where the raw agricultural commodities - grapes
or milk - are produced. Only those wines and cheeses pro-
duced according to these rules may be legally marketed under
the geographically significant appellation of origin.
Although France hopes to place the successful marketing of
AOCs at the heart of its agricultural policy, 2 the AOC system is
not likely to win full legal recognition in the United States.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Visit-
ing Professor, Facult6 de Droit et des Sciences Politiques, Universit6 de Nantes,
1995. I thank the Conseil Gdnral de Loire-Atlantique for its financial support
of this Article. I also thank Louis Lorvellec for translating this Article into
French and for lending me advice and encouragement throughout my stay in
Nantes. Tracey Chabala provided able research assistance. The French ver-
sion of this Article will appear as Le statut lgal des appellations d'origine con-
tr6lde aux gtats-Unis d'Amdrique, 237 REVUE DE DROIT RURAL (forthcoming
1996) (on file with author).
To the fullest possible extent, I have used official translations from French
to English. The polyglot editors of the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade have
generously helped me translate French texts for which no official English trans-
lation is available. I alone bear the responsibility for any mistranslations. Cf
Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1269-72, 1283-90 (1995) (describing foreign language acquisition, including the
inevitable perils of mistranslation, as the nonlegal activity most akin to legal
learning).
1. See CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION [CODE CONSOM.] art. L. 115-1 to -33
(Fr.).
2. See, e.g., Marie-H616ne Bienaym6, La protection des mentions gd-
ographiques par les appellations d'origine contrloes, 237 REVUE DE DROIT Ru-
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France faces an uphill struggle in reconciling this distinctly
French and uniquely agricultural form of intangible property
with hostile notions in foreign and international law. Although
AOCs are commonplace in the civilian legal systems of Catholic
Europe and recognized under the laws of the European Union,
their American counterparts are far less protective of the "geo-
graphic" and "human" factors embraced by the French AOC sys-
tem. International recognition of geographical indications
suggests that AOCs are not fully protected outside the bounda-
ries of France and the European Union. In short, substantial
legal barriers hamper the restructuring of the global food and
beverage trade according to the French model, as epitomized by
the AOC system.
This pessimistic assessment of French AOCs is not rooted in
a cultural or ideological opposition to this form of intangible
property. In one sense, of course, the very idea of protecting in-
tellectual and cultural property unique to agriculture is a form
of resistance to the reconciliation of agricultural law with mod-
ern economic and social conditions.3 French agricultural ex-
perts, convinced that the AOC system can serve as a
springboard for French food and beverage exports, are debating
the best form of international legal recognition for French
AOCs.4 Outside France, admirers of the AOC system have
RAL (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 11, on file with author) (describing the
A0C as "an agricultural policy of the future").
3. Cf. Louis Lorvellec, Rapport de synth~se, 233 REVUE DE DRoIT RURAL
251, 252 (May 1995):
At least since the Code civil, and up to the little revolution of preferen-
tial attribution, agriculture was regulated in French law as the act of
appropriating the fruits of the earth, perfectly encompassed by the con-
cepts underlying individual property and contract. Since 1938, we
have become increasingly willing to accept the idea that the law should
organize agricultural business as a for-profit business - that is, a
business generating wealth through independent means of production.
("Au moins depuis le Code civil, et jusqu'd la petite rdvolution de
l'attribution prdfdrentielle, l'agriculture a W rdgie en droit franais
comme l'activitg d'appropriation des fruits de la terre, parfaitement en-
cadrde par les concepts de base de la propridt6 individuelle et du con-
tract. Depuis 1938, lVide s'est progressivement imposde que l'conomie
agricole devait Otre organisde par le droit comme une 6conomie
d'entreprise, c'est-d-dire une 6conomie de la production de richesses par
des unites autonomes de production.")
4. See, e.g., Vronique Romain Prot, Origine Gdographique et Signes de
Qualitd: Protection Internationale, 237 REVUE DE DRorr RURAL (forthcoming
1996) (on file with author).
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lauded the French legal approach.5 What is needed - and what
this Article hopes to supply - is not a set of philosophical mus-
ings on the juridical nature of AOCs, but rather a dose of cold
realism regarding the inhospitable legal climate that AOCs will
likely find in the world's richest nation.
Part I of this Article describes AOCs and allied concepts in
their native legal context. French law and the law of the Euro-
pean Union vigorously protect AOCs and the agribusiness model
made possible by the imposition of strict geographic limits on
the production of certain fine foods. In surveying the American
equivalents of these laws, Part II shows how alien the AOC is to
the American legal system. Part III of this Article explores the
extent to which treaty obligations require the United States to
accommodate the appellation of origin as a legal concept and to
shield products bearing a French AOC from "unfair" competition
in American consumer markets. Key exceptions to the recent
accord on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS)6 effectively eviscerate any legal protection for many of
the most prominent AOC-protected products. Part IV concludes
that supporters of the French AOC system would be better ad-
vised to engage in more aggressive marketing and consumer ed-
ucation than to prolong a losing battle against American law.
I. APPELLATIONS OF ORIGIN UNDER FRENCH AND
COMMUNITY LAW
A. FRANCE
Throughout Europe and especially in France, the AOC sys-
tem structures the division of agricultural labor and shapes food
markets. The French Code de la Consommation7 defines an
AOC as "the designation of a country, of a region, or of a locality
that serves to indicate that a product originates from that place
and owes its quality or characteristics to its geographic sur-
5. See, e.g., Kevin H. Josel, Note, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Protection
of France's Wine Classification System Beyond Its Borders, 12 B.U. INTrL L.J.
471 (1994).
6. See Annex 1C to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay
Round, World Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, re-
printed in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS].
7. The Code de la Consommation is an autonomous body of legislation ad-
dressing food-related aspects of agricultural regulation. It is separately codified
so that its multidisciplinary scope will not be diluted by other sources of French
law, especially the law of contracts. See Jean-Pierre Pizzio, Introduction, in
CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION 1,1 (1995).
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roundings."s Critically, this definition comprises both "natural
factors and human factors."9 An AOC thus protects both "na-
ture" and "culture":10 the geographic component of an AOC iden-
tifies the "natural" factors that contribute to a product's
distinctiveness, while the express legal protection of "human
factors" guarantees that local farmers will continue to control
the lucrative value-adding process by which raw materials are
transformed into prized foods or beverages.
The AOC is an unusual and an unusually strong species of
intangible property. It combines aspects of trademark law and
of the law of regulated industries. An AOC conveys a highly
complex set of information to the consumer. Unlike most prod-
ucts protected by commercial trademarks, which generally com-
municate consistency in manufacturing, AOC-protected
products typically reflect seasonal and annual variations in the
designated locale's climate." Furthermore, unlike traditional
forms of intellectual property, an AOC "can never be considered
to reflect a generic character and thus can never fall into the
public domain."' 2 The geographic component of an AOC "may
not be used for any similar product or for any other product or
service as long as such a use is capable of altering or weakening
the distinctiveness of the appellation of origin."' 3 Thus, French
law prohibits not only the use of "Roquefort" to designate
cheeses produced outside the terms of Roquefort's AOC,' 4 but
also the use of "Champagne" as the name of a perfume. 15
Although one must take care in analogizing to the American
8. CODE CONSOM. art. L. 115-1 ("Ia ddnomination d'un pays, d'une rdgion
ou d'une localit servant d ddsigner un produit qui en est originaire et dont la
qualitd ou les caractres sont dus au milieu gdographique").
9. Id. (emphasis added) ("des facteurs naturels et des facteurs humains").
10. See generally ALAIN, LooMME Er L'ANImAL (1962).
11. See generally Romain-Prot, supra note 4.
12. CODE CONSOM. art. L. 115-5 (emphasis added) ("ne peut jamais 4tre con-
sid~rge comme prdsentant un caractdre gndrique et tomber dans le domaine
public").
13. Id. ("ne peuvent etre employds pour aucun produit similaire . .. ni pour
aucun autre produit ou service lorsque cette utilisation est susceptible de
detourner ou d'affaiblir la notoridtd de l'appellation d'origine").
14. See Judgment of July 5, 1994 (Conf~d6ration g~n~rale des producteurs
de lait de brebis et des industriels de Roquefort v. Chambre syndicale des in-
dustriels de Roquefort), Cass. com., 1994 Bull. Civ. 7, No. 249, at 197 (Fr.).
15. See Judgment of Dec. 15, 1993 (SA Yves Saint-Laurent Parfums v. In-
stitut National des Appellations d'Origine), Cour d'appel de Paris, 1994 D.S.
Jur. 145 (Fr.); Caroline Lambre, Le champagne ou leparfum de la renommde, 27
RECUEIL DALLOZ SmEy 213 (1994).
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legal system, 16 one can safely say that the French AOC law com-
bines the consumer protection rationale of the federal Lanham
Act 17 with the "moral rights" rationale underlying the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,' 8
the Copyright Act of 1976,19 and various state laws that prohibit
the dilution of trademarks and trade names.20
There may be an even more suitable analogy in American
and Community law. The AOC is a close cousin of the ecolabel,
a consumer-oriented mark that seeks to identify a category of
products that adheres to a publicly ascertainable list of specffic
ecological criteria. 2 1 In 1992, the Council of Ministers of the Eu-
ropean Union promulgated a regulation authorizing the estab-
lishment of an ecolabel under the supervision of the European
Commission and in consultation with various industrial, com-
16. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HIRv. L. REv. 741,
746 (1993) (noting that analogical reasoning typically leads to "incompletely
theorized judgments" based on "principles operating at a low or intermediate
level of abstraction" but nevertheless yields a sort of "principled consistency" in
legal analysis).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Consumer confusion is the central con-
cern of the Lanham Act, the primary piece of federal trademark legislation in
the United States. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2753 (1992); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992).
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
art. 6bis (signed at Berne, Sept. 9, 1986) (guaranteeing, "[ilndependently of the
author's economic rights," the "right to claim authorship of [a] work and to ob-
ject to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification ... which would be prej-
udicial to [the author's] honor or reputation"); Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1988) (awarding an author the right "to claim
authorship," "to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create," and "to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of [a] work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation").
20. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (West 1988); L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that state an-
tidilution statutes "fill a void left by the failure of [federal] trademark law" to
prohibit uses of marks that do not exhibit a "likelihood of confusion between the
original use and the infringing use"); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied
Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977).
21. See generally, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 N.W.
L. REv. 1227, 1246-50 (1995); Ciannat M. Howett, Note, The "Green Labeling"
Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of Environmental Product
Claims, 11 VA. ENVWL. L.J. 401 (1992).
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mercial, labor, consumer, and environmental interest groups. 22
The closest equivalent of the ecolabel in American law is the cer-
tification of organic food production and processing made possi-
ble by the federal Organic Foods Production Act of 199023 and
its state-law counterparts. 24 State laws may impose more strin-
gent production and labeling standards for organic foods, subject
to approval by the United States Secretary of Agriculture. 25
American law provides one final analogy - unsuccessful ef-
forts to force the disclosure of intense production methods in
animal agriculture. 26 Indeed, AOCs may share more in common
with organic food and "humane treatment" labels than with eco-
labels. Whereas an ecolabel suggests that the certified food pro-
duction method is more beneficial for the environment than are
noncertified alternatives, neither an organic food certificate nor
an AOC guarantees any specific beneficial impact on food qual-
ity, the environment, or the structure of the food production and
processing industries. Rather, the geographically based produc-
tion standards underlying an AOC and the anti-chemical
promises underlying an organic food certificate rest on a general
belief that reducing the number of synthetic substitutes for agri-
cultural land - as all biological inputs such as pesticides and
fertilizers ultimately are27 - has a net positive impact on agri-
culture's natural and human constituents.
22. See Council Regulation 880/92, art. 6, 1992 O.J. (L99) 1; Dinah L.
Shelton, Environmental Rights in the European Community, 16 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 557, 575-76 (1993).
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-22 (1994).
24. See, e.g., California Organic Foods Act of 1990, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 26569.24 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. § 504.21-.33 (Supp. 1995); cf.,
e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 31.92- .94 (Supp. 1995) (authorizing the administrative pro-
mulgation of rules defining standards for the production and labeling of organic
foods); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 181(1995 Supp.) (same); Wis. STAT. § 97.09
(Supp. 1995) (same); 1985 Minn. Laws 237, § 2 (declaring "a public benefit in
establishing standards for food products marketed and labeled using the term
'organic' or a derivative of [that] term").
25. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6503(b), 6506(c), 6507 (1988). See generally Charles P.
Mitchell, State Regulation and Federal Pre-emption of Food Labeling, 45 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 123 (1990) (discussing the reconciliation of potential conflicts
between federal and state organic food labeling laws); Kyle W. Lathrop, Note,
Pre-empting Appels with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Label-
ing, 16 J. Corn. L. 885 (1991) (same).
26. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F.
Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986) (rejecting an effort to require veal producers to dis-
close on-farm practices that allegedly violated state laws against cruelty to
animals).
27. See, e.g., Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society,
48 J. FARM ECON. 1100, 1104 (1966); Vernon W. Ruttan, Constraints on the De-
sign of Sustainable Systems of Agriculture, 10 ECOL. ECON. 209, 212 (1994).
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The economic and sociological effects of the AOC system are
both c6lMbre and cdldbr6 in France - that is, "celebrated" in the
sense of "famous" and in the sense of "revered". The legal union
of "natural factors" and "human factors" enables French farmers
- freeholders and tenants alike28 - to capture and control the
value-adding process that transforms their raw products into
gourmet consumption goods. The AOC system segments the
production market and shields it from outside competitors, thus
helping to prop up farming and related industries as significant
sources of jobs. On the consumer side, tight geographic and
processed-based restrictions guarantee certain consumer expec-
tations. 29 The AOC as quality control thus accordingly fulfills
the "Catholic" satisfaction and service objectives of the droit
agro-alimentaire in France.30
The impact of the AOC laws on the political economy of
French and European agriculture cannot be understated. Farm-
ers armed with AOC rights are not merely producers of raw
materials; thanks to the exclusive nature of their right to pro-
cess those materials into the finished food products bearing the
prized AOC, these farmers become agribusinesses in their own
right.3 1 Farmers such as the vintners in Champagne who pro-
28. Thanks to a tenant farmer's virtually inviolate right of renewal under
the Law of Tenant Farming and Sharecropping ("Statut du fermage et du
mWtayage"), CODE RURAL, art. L. 411-417 (Fr.), tenants and freehold farmers
alike can capitalize any economic advantage from the AOC system directly into
their rights to cultivate a specific tract of land.
29. See generally Jean-Pierre Lestoille, Les outils juridiques de protection
de denomination au service d'une dynamique de qualitg, 237 REVUE DE DROIT
RURAL (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 4-6, on file with author).
30. See Jean-Paul Branlard, La reconnaissance et la protection par le Droit
des mentions d'origine gdographique comme dlment de qualite des produits ali-
mentaires, 237 REVUE DE DROIT RURAL (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 2, on
file with author) ("L'attente 'qualit' se fait sur la Sdcuritd, la Santd, le Service et
bien dvidemment la Satisfaction des sens, c'est la qualitg gustative."). Health
and safety - la Santd and la SgcuriM - constitute the so-called "Protestant"
objectives of French food regulation. Together, Protestant santd and sgcurit6
and Catholic satisfaction and service form the four "S's" in France's droit agro-
alimentaire.
31. The term "agribusiness" is attributed to John H. Davis of the Harvard
Business School and has come to denote "the sum total of all operations in-
volved in the manufacture and distribution of farm supplies; production opera-
tions on the farm; and the storage, processing, and distribution of farm
commodities and items made from them." JOHN H. DAvIs & RAY A. GOLDBERG,
A CONCEPT OF AGRIBUSINESS 2 (1957); see also id. at 2 n.1 (attributing the term
"agribusiness" to an October 1955 speech by Davis). The term has become
something of a lightning rod, attracting the condemnation of those who believe
that industrialization and mass production are the root of all the evils that have
befallen American agriculture. See, e.g., A.V. KREBS, THE CORPORATE REAPERS:
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duce that region's prized sparkling wine control the viticultural
process from the vineyard to the dinner table, directing all
value-added processes along the way and capitalizing these prof-
its into their land. French law thus dictates what American law
is merely content to facilitate through the Capper-Volstead
Act3 2 and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act:33 farm-
stead-to-doorstep domination of discrete product markets. Such
a transformation of the farmer as an economically weak supplier
of natural resources into a captain of agribusiness requires gov-
ernment to suspend the ordinary rules of free enterprise. 34 On
occasion American courts have balked at granting farmers and
their cooperatives the degree of monopoly power needed to inte-
grate an entire line of food processing into their business portfo-
lios.3 5 By contrast, monopoly power over clearly segmented
markets for certain fine foods is precisely what the AOC system
hopes to deliver to French farmers.
In his response to this Article, Louis Lorvellec argues that
"the appellation of origin is not an object of property at all."3 6
Professor Lorvellec's protest notwithstanding, the French AOC
THE BOOK OF AGRIBUSINESS (1992); INGOLF VOGELER, THE MYTH OF THE FAMILY
FARM: AGRIBUSINESS DOMINANCE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE (1981).
32. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988) (exempting cooperative associations owned
by "[plersons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers"
from certain types of antitrust liability so that they may freely engage "in col-
lectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing" their
products). The Capper-Volstead Act is regarded as the "Magna Carta of Coop-
erative Marketing." THEODORE SALouTos, THE AMERICAN FARMER AND THE
NEW DEAL 27 (1982).
33. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624, 671-674 (1988).
34. For paradigmatic expressions of American law's willingness to excuse
farmers from state and federal antitrust laws, see National Broiler Marketing
Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 842 (1978); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
146 (1940).
35. See, e.g., Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States,
362 U.S. 458, 472 (1960) (exposing an agricultural cooperative to federal anti-
trust liability for monopolization, anticompetitive mergers, and conspiracies ex-
tending outside the cooperative's membership); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939) (refusing to immunize conspiracies between a coopera-
tive and outside coconspirators). But cf. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1994) (authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to regulate any association of producers that "mono-
polizes or restrains trade... to such an extent that the price of any agricultural
product is unduly enhanced"); Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635
F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980) (limiting agricultural cooperatives' liability
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, to "the acquisition of[monop-
oly] power by ... predatory means" rather than "such acts as the formation,
growth and combination of agricultural cooperatives"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
818 (1981).
36. Louis Lorvellec, You've Got to Fight for Your Right to Party: A Response
to Professor Jim Chen, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 65, 72 (1996).
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is most assuredly a form of property. French wine and cheese
producers adhering to a particular AOC jealously guard their
rights and privileges against all perceived threats. Under the
Code de la Consommation, "[e]very person who claims that an
appellation of origin is applied... contrary to the origin of [a]
product" in such a way as to cause "direct or indirect prejudice"
to the claimant's rights may demand a hearing that could lead to
an injunction against the usage of the offending AOC. 37 Certain
vintners recently exercised this extraordinary right in a spectac-
ular fight over "Margaux," a prized viticultural appellation of or-
igin. Spurred by complaints from established Margaux
vintners, the Institut National des Appellations d'Origine
(INAO) initially denied the Margaux AOC to Societ6 Chateau
d'Arsac, an upstart winery whose lands had previously housed
chickens rather than vineyards.3 8 In July 1995, the Conseil
d' tat, France's supreme administrative court, ordered the
INAO to award the Margaux AOC to Chateau d'Arsac.3 9
Although a "geological study" has "concluded that part of [Cha-
teau d'Arsac's] land did have the same characteristics as Mar-
gaux terrain," rival vintners plan to continue challenging the
legal proceedings that have given the newcomer "'a Margaux
passport without being geologically correct.' "40
An entitlement to challenge rival AOC claims arms French
wine and cheese producers with property as that term is under-
stood in American constitutional law, in Hohfeldian jurispru-
dence, and in the law of regulated industries. The Code de la
Consommation "support[s] claims of entitlement" by favored
farmers to "certain benefits" associated with the exclusive use of
commercially valuable appellations of origin. 41 Under the Code,
these farmers enjoy (1) the privilege of producing and marketing
an AOC-protected wine or cheese, (2) rights and claims against
others who misappropriate the informational value of an AOC,
(3) the power to challenge an AOC not granted in accordance
37. CODE CONSOM. art. 115-8 ("Toute personne qui pretendra qu'une appel-
lation d'origine est appliqude, e son prejudice direct ou indirect et contre son
droit, d un produit naturel ou fabriqud, contrairement t l'origine de ce produit,
aura une action en justice pour faire interdire l'usage de cette appellation.").
38. See Societe ChAteau d'Arsac, NC 112.635 (Conseil d'etat, Fr. Sept. 20,
1993) (reversing the INAO's denial of Chfteau d'Arsac's application for a Mar-
gaux AOC).
39. See Societk ChAteau d'Arsac, NC 158.609 (Conseil d'etat, Fr. July 28,
1995).
40. Thomas Kamm, In Vintage Quest, Frenchman Throws Down the Goblet,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at Al, A16.
41. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
1996]
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with previously established geographic criteria, and (4) immu-
nity against the transformation of an AOC into a generic label
resting in the public domain. The AOC thus displays nothing
short of the full panoply of Hohfeldian interests in property.
42
At the heart of this proprietary scheme lies a legal commitment
to avoid "economic injury to an existing [producer]" through di-
lution or other misuse of an appellation of origin.43 It is true, as
Professor Lorvellec observes, that an AOC-protected farmer may
not transfer or transport her production and processing rights to
a third party.44 That farmer nevertheless wields the power to
exclude certain competitors, just as any residential tenant holds
the right of quiet enjoyment even if she is barred from subletting
or assigning her lease. The power to exclude is the power of
property, and the AOC system gives that power to French farm-
ers in abundance.
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION
Community law undoubtedly protects AOCs in their full
sense under French law. The relevant regulations of the Council
of Ministers of the European Union create two regimes gov-
erning appellations of origin. Wines and other alcoholic bever-
ages may be protected as "distinctive regional wines" ["vins de
qualit6 provenant de r~gions dtermindes'] or VQPRDs for
short.45 All other products may bear a "protected designation of
origin."46 France reconciles the Community's VQPRD and
designation of origin systems by restricting VQPRDs to wines
that qualify for an AOC under French law.4 7 From the French
consumer's point of view, the three competing regimes are
42. See generally Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746-47 (1917).
43. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940) (holding
that "economic injury to an existing" broadcast licensee "is not a separate and
independent element to be taken into consideration" in federal radio regula-
tion). But cf Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1958) ("[Elconomic injury to an existing station, while not in and of itself a mat-
ter of moment, becomes important when.. it spells diminution or destruction
of service."). See generally Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show on the Twilight of
Federal Mass Communications Regulation, 80 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming
1996) (describing the "renewal expectancy" and other forms of regulatory prop-
erty in federal broadcast licensing).
44. See Lorvellec, supra note 36, at 69; cf 47 C.F.R. § 1.597 (1995) (restrict-
ing the resale of federal radio and television broadcast licenses).
45. Council Regulation 24/62 of Apr. 4, 1962, 1962 O.J. (989) 1.
46. Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992, 1992 O.J. (L208) 1.
47. See CODE CONSOM. art. 115-26-1 alin~a 3; See also Louis LORVELLEC,
DRorr RURAL 421 (1988) (noting that individual member-states are free to regu-
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merged in a single label: the same emblem on cheese is recog-
nized as an AOC in Paris and a designation of origin in Brussels,
and only those vintners who have secured AOC protection under
French law may seek shelter under the European VQPRD
system.
The European definition of a designation of origin therefore
controls the legal status of a French AOC in the other member-
states of the European Union. Community law defines a
designation of origin in terms indistinguishable from those used
in French law to define an AOC:
the name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country,
used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff... originating
in that region, specific place or country, and the quality or characteris-
tics of which are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geo-
graphical environment with its inherent natural and human factors,
and the production, processing and preparation of which take place in
the defined geographical area.
4 8
Like French law, the Community definition of a designation of
origin makes the crucial connection between "natural" and
"human" factors. By contrast, a mere "geographical indication"
lacks this essential link. Community law defines a "geographi-
cal indication" as a designation for "an agricultural product or a
foodstuff ... which possesses a specific quality, reputation or
other characteristics attributable to that geographical
origin . . ."49
Moreover, under Community law, an agricultural product or
foodstuff bearing a geographical indication may have any one of
three connections with "the defined geographical area."50 Un-
like a product bearing a designation of origin, whose "produc-
tion, processing and preparation" must all "take place in the
defined geographical area," either "production," "processing," or
"preparation" standing alone supplies a sufficient territorial link
between a product and its geographical indication.51 These defi-
nitions under Community law are significant because they show
that a multinational agreement can easily distinguish between
late their own appellations more stringently than required under Community
law).
48. Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992, 1992 O.J. (L208) 2 (art.
2.2(a)). There is no small irony in the fact that this regulation was promulgated
on the French national holiday. For more extensive discussion of these aspects
of Community law, see Bienaym6, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14-16).
49. Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992, 1992 O.J. (L208) 2 (art.
2.2(b)).
50. Id.
51. Compare id. art. 2.2(a) (designation of origin) with id. art. 2.2(b) (geo-
graphical indication).
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ordinary geographical indications and appellations or designa-
tions of origin, which combine "geographic" and "human" factors.
Although Community law does not permit a generic
designation to be registered either as a designation of origin or
as a geographical indication, the determination of generic status
depends, inter alia, upon "the existing situation within the
Member-State" and upon pertinent national legislation.52 For
purposes of Community law, a designation is generic if it has
become so "at the time of entry into force of that Convention
[concerning AOCs and geographical indications] or subsequently
thereto ... in the country of origin."53 Like French law, Commu-
nity law prohibits "any direct or indirect commercial use of a
name registered in respect of products not covered by the regis-
tration" and "any other practice liable to mislead the public as to
the true origin of the product."54 No "misuse, imitation or evoca-
tion" will be tolerated even if tempered by words "such as 'style',
'method', 'as produced in', 'imitation' or 'similar'." 55
From the French perspective, it is vital that the European
Union's definition of designations of origin rests explicitly on na-
tional legal standards. The Madrid Agreement for the Repres-
sion of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods
highlights the importance of this factor. 56 The Madrid Agree-
52. Id. at 3 (art. 3.1).
53. Case 3/91, Exportur SA v. LOR SA Confiserie du Tech (Nov. 10, 1992)
(emphasis added).
54. Council Regulation 2081/92, 1992 O.J. (L208) 6 (art. 13.1(a), (d)).
55. Id. (art. 13.1(b)); see also Case 306/93, SMW Winzersekt GmbH v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz (Dec. 13, 1994) (prohibiting the marketing of sparkling wine
marked "Flaschengarung im Champagnerverfahren" or "klassische Flaschen-
garung - m6thode champenoise" - i.e., "in-the-bottle fermentation according
to the Champagne method" or "classic in-the-bottle fermentation - Cham-
pagne method"); cf ARRA' DU 30 MARS 1990, 1990 REVUE SUISSE DE LA
PRPRIAT2 INTELLECTUELLE 371 (prohibiting, under the authority of the Franco-
Swiss treaty of March 14, 1974, D 75 1041 du 23 octobre 1975 J.O. 11, the sale
of bottles marked "Champagne" even though the manufacturer also provided
"the indication of the actual geographic origin on the label" ("lYindication de la
provenance rdelle sur lgtiquette")). The free trade provisions of European law
may pose an independent restraint on the AOC and AOP laws of individual
member-states. Cf Case 47/90, dtablissements Delhaize fr~res et Compagnie
Le Lion SA v. Promalvin SA (June 9, 1992) (holding that a Spanish AOC regula-
tion that limited the exportable quantities of a protected wine constituted a
quantitative export restriction in violation of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE Eu-
ROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 34).
56. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications
of Source on Goods of Apr. 14, 1891, revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at
The Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon on Oct.
31, 1958, 828 U.N.T.S. 165 (1972). The United States is not a signatory to this
agreement.
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ment requires that "[aill goods bearing a false or deceptive indi-
cation by which one of the countries to which this Agreement
applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indi-
cated as being the country or place of origin shall be seized on
importation into any of the said countries."5 7 Like its predeces-
sor, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty,58 the Madrid Agreement does not prevent uses that
disclose a product's true origin. 59 The Agreement's sole promise
for greater protection of AOCs lies in its fourth article: despite
giving national courts the power to "decide what appellations, on
account of their generic character, do not fall within the provi-
sions of this Agreement," the treaty explicitly provides that "re-
gional appellations concerning the source of products of the vine
[are] excluded from [this] reservation . "...-60
The Madrid Agreement thus implies, but does not explicitly
state, that national courts should determine the generic status
of geographical indications for wine by reference to the laws of
the state from which the wine originates. Perhaps because of
this exception's odd phrasing, courts in countries bound by the
Arrangement of Madrid have accorded virtually no protection
for foreign viticultural products. The Supreme Court of Brazil,
for example, has explicitly held that the AOCs Champagne and
Cognac are generic and part of the Brazilian public domain.
61
Japan consistently allows importation of American and Austra-
lian wines that incorporate French AOCs into their labels. 62
This brief survey of French and Community law highlights
how vigorously French AOCs and European designations of ori-
gin are protected. In the Catholic countries of southern Europe,
especially France and Italy, the notion of "quality" embodied by
the AOC comprises "the flavor, the excellence, and the authen-
ticity of the land."63 By contrast, in an American legal system
strongly influenced by its Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins, qual-
57. Id. art. 1(1).
58. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of Mar. 20,
1883, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 6 I.L.M. 806 (1967) as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14,
1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London
on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,
and amended on Oct. 2, 1979.
59. See Romain Prot, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9).
60. Madrid Agreement, supra note 56, art. 4.
61. See Romain Prot, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9) (citing the decision of
the Brazilian Supreme Court of 26 Nov., 1974, Rondo INAO n.95-105).
62. See id. (manuscript at 9).
63. See id. (manuscript at 2) ("la saveur, l'excellence et l'authenticit6 des
terroirs").
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ity is "above all synonymous with security, with a regularity
that follows a trademark more closely than it does a geographi-
cal indication."64 How little respect the geographical indication
has in the United States will be evident from even the most cur-
sory of surveys of American law.
II. APPELLATIONS OF ORIGIN UNDER AMERICAN LAW
Whereas France gives the INAO regulatory authority over a
wide range of food and beverage products,65 the United States
confines appellations of origin to wine. Viticultural regulation is
primarily a matter of federal law. The United States' 14-year
experiment with Prohibition 66 inflicted serious damage on wine-
and beer-making traditions that were already much younger
and weaker than their European counterparts.6 7 Short of im-
posing discriminatory taxes on out-of-state products, 68 individ-
ual states remain free to regulate commerce in alcoholic
beverages;69 some localities ban their manufacture, sale, or
both.
In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act (FAAA)70 in order to fill the legal vacuum created by
Prohibition and its repeal.71 The FAAA bans wine labels and
advertisements that are not:
in conformity with such regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury ... as will prohibit deception of the consumer... and
as will prohibit, irrespective of falsity, such statements... as the Sec-
retary of the Treasury finds to be likely to mislead the consumer;... as
will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity
64. Id. ("avant tout synonyme de sdcuritd, de rdgularit6 correspond plus d
une d~marche de marque que d'indication gdographique").
65. See CODE CONSOM. art. L. 115-19 (dividing the INAO into three commit-
tees: one for wines, brandies, ciders, and other liqueurs and aperitifs ["les vins,
eaux-de-vie, cidres, poirds, apdritifs d base de cidres, de poirds ou de vins"]; an-
other for dairy products ["des produits laitiers"]; and a third for other products).
66. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XXI (imposing a nationwide prohibi-
tion of all "intoxicating liquors" in 1919 and then repealing it in 1933).
67. But see ALEXis LICHINE, NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WINES AND SPIrrs 482-
84 (1981) (tracing the history of American viticulture to roots predating the
California gold rush of 1849); Josel, supra note 5, at 474-75.
68. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); accord James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
70. 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-19a (1988).
71. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1588 (1995); National
Distrib. Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1004-06 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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and quality of the products... [and] as will prohibit statements [on the
label] that are . . . false [or] misleading.
7 2
Within the Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) regulates viticultural labeling
and advertising, 73 activities historically thought to be fraught
with deceptive and misleading practices.74 The BATF's oeno-
logical standards govern, among other things, standards of iden-
tity, 75  the effects of blending and cellar treatment, 76
designations of grape types,77 standards for the "estate bottled"
designation, 78 and vintage. 79
The BATF also regulates what it calls "appellations of ori-
gin."8 0 Although the American analogue of the French AOC
does not specifically protect both geographic and human factors,
it does take both elements into account. The BATF rules distin-
guish between designations that refer to political subdivisions
(such as a country, a state, a county, or the political equivalent
in non-American legal systems) and designations that refer to
"viticultural area[s]." 8s "Political" appellations of origin impose
a relatively weak limit on the content; at least seventy-five per-
cent of the wine must be "derived from fruit or agricultural prod-
ucts grown" in the indicated area.8 2 There is no obligation to
provide any evidence regarding the viticultural characteristics
of the chosen political entity. A bottle containing seventy-five
percent wine derived from fruit grown in Georgia may call itself
"Georgia wine," even though "[t]he climate is wrong, there's no
history" of winemaking, and the state consumes a miniscule 4.73
liters of wine per capita each year.8 3 An appellation of origin
referring to two or three counties in one state means that "all of
the fruit or other agricultural products were grown in the coun-
72. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1988) (labeling); id. 205(f) (advertising).
73. See id. § 202.
74. See Taylor Wine Co. v. Department of Treasury, 509 F. Supp. 792, 794
(D.D.C. 1981).
75. See Labeling and Advertising of Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.21 (1994).
76. See id. § 4.22.
77. See id. § 4.23.
78. See id. § 4.26.
79. See id. § 4.27.
80. See id. § 4.25a.
81. See Wawszkiewicz v. Department of the Treasury, 480 F. Supp. 739,
742 n.7 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
82. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.25a(b)(1)(i) (1994) (American wine); id. § 4.25a(b)(2)(i)
(imported wine).
83. Anita Sharpe, Georgia Wine? Why the Very Thought Comes as a Sur-
prise, WALL ST. J. EURoPE, July 4, 1995, at 1, 5.
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ties indicated" and that "the percentage of the wine derived from
fruit or other agricultural products grown in each county is
shown on the label with a tolerance of plus or minus two per-
cent."8 4 Multistate appellations of origin are likewise available
for wine derived from products grown in two or three contiguous
states.8 5
The BATF sets more stringent requirements for appella-
tions of origin that refer to a specific "viticultural area" rather
than to a more general political designation. Any wine so desig-
nated must derive at least eighty-five percent of its volume from
grapes grown within the viticultural area.8 6 For imported wine,
the BATF accepts the definition of the viticultural area under
foreign law.87 American wine with an appellation of origin
based on a viticultural area must come from a "delimited grape
growing region distinguishable by geographical features."88 The
BATF process for identifying an "Approved American Viticul-
tural Area" requires, inter alia, (1) evidence that the chosen
name is locally or nationally known as the name of the specified
area, (2) historical or current evidence of the area's boundaries,
and (3) evidence of geographic features (such as climate, soil,
elevation and topography) that distinguish the area's viticul-
tural characteristics from those of surrounding areas and estab-
lish a local reputation for winemaking.8 9
According to BATF rules, all wines using an appellation of
origin must follow any applicable local, state, or foreign laws
governing the composition, manufacture and designation of such
wines. 90 Except for wines using a multicounty appellation of or-
igin, American wines must be fully finished within the geo-
graphic area designated. 91  Whether imported wines are
similarly restricted depends on foreign law.
Although much weaker than their French counterparts, the
BATF rules do address soil type, mineral content and quality
84. 27 C.F.R. § 4.25a(c) (1994).
85. See id. § 4.25a(d).
86. See id. § 4.25a(e)(3)(ii).
87. See id. § 4.25a(e)(1)(ii), 4.25a(e)(3)(i).
88. Id. § 4.25a(e)(1)(i).
89. See id. § 4.25a(e)(2); see also id. §§ 9.23, 71.41(c).
90. See id. § 4.25a(b)(1)(iii) (American wine); id. § 4.25a(b)(2)(ii) (imported
wine).
91. See id. § 4.25a(b)(1)(ii) (nationwide, statewide, or countywide appella-
tions); id. § 4.25a(d)(2) (multistate appellations); id. § 4.25a(e)(3)(iv) (multistate
appellations). A similar requirement is inexplicably missing from the provision
describing the requirements for a multicounty appellation of origin. See id.
§ 4.25a(c).
[Vol. 5:29
APPELLATioNs D'OiGINE CoNTR6Lk'E
control. 92 Under American law, as much as a quarter of the
wine in a geographically designated bottle may be derived from
grapes grown in an altogether different area.93 The seventy-five
percent rule has been justified as a "reasoned and amply eluci-
dated" application of a statutory standard that requires the
BATF to prohibit "'statements . . . likely to mislead the con-
sumer.'"94 Furthermore, the only real link between "geo-
graphic" and "human" factors is the very weak requirement that
wine be finished in the same area identified by its appellation of
origin.95 Federal law relegates the regulation of "human" fac-
tors such as quality control and supply management to state,
local or foreign law. If there is no such law, all that federal law
requires is (1) that a wine derive seventy-five percent of its vol-
ume from grapes grown in the designated area (or eighty-five
percent for wines originating in a recognized "viticultural area")
and (2) that the wine be finished in the designated area. 96
Weak as these rules may appear to French eyes, they were
even more lenient at one time. BATF rules in effect before De-
cember 31, 1982, accorded an appellation of origin to any wine
(1) deriving as little as seventy-five percent of its volume from
the geographic region indicated by its name, (2) fully manufac-
tured and finished "within the State in which such... region is
located," and (3) conforming to any state or local rules governing
the composition, manufacture, and designation of such wine.97
Wine did not necessarily have to be finished within the wine-
growing region itself, as long as this process took place within
the same state. Cellar treatment or blending outside the region
92. Contra Josel, supra note 5, at 474 (asserting that the BATF rules do
not address these matters).
93. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.25a(b) (1994) (requiring "[a]t least 75 percent" of an
imported wine or an American wine claiming "an appellation of origin other
than a multicounty or multistate appellation, or a vitucultural area" to be "de-
rived from fruit or agricultural products grown in the appellation area indi-
cated"); cf id. § 4.25a(e)(3)(ii) (requiring a wine "labeled with a viticultural area
appellation" to derive "[not less than 85 percent of" its wine content "from
grapes grown within the boundaries of the viticultural area"). For a list of
American viticultural areas approved by the BATF, see id. part 9.
94. See Wawszkiewicz v. Department of the Treasury, 670 F.2d 296, 302-03
(D.C. Cir. 1981), (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(1) (1988)) (emphasis added).
95. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.25a(b)(1)(ii) (1994) (nationwide, statewide, or county-
wide appellations); id. § 4.25a(d)(2) (multistate appellations); id.
§ 4.25a(e)(3)(iv) (multistate appellations).
96. As to wine content, see id. § 4.25a(b), (e)(3)(ii). As to the finishing re-
quirement, see id. § 4.25a(b)(1)(ii), (d)(2), (e)(3)(iv).
97. Id. § 4.25(a); see also id. § 4.25(c) (depriving this rule of legal effect af-
ter December 31, 1982).
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of origin did not deprive such wines of their entitlement to an
appellation of origin.98 The seventy-five percent rule repre-
sented a substantial increase from the fifty-one percent limita-
tion under the original rules that the BATF adopted soon after
the passage of the FAAA in 1935. 99 Those rules were not for-
mally approved (much less challenged or changed) until the late
1970s.100
The strongest form of legal protection for geographical indi-
cations in the United States may be found in state law. Some
state statutes restrict the use of specific geographical indications
associated with local specialty products. Georgia bans the use of
the word "Vidalia" to describe onions other than those grown in
a specified area near the town of Vidalia, 101 and Hawaii imposes
labeling and minimum content requirements on Kona coffee -
that is, coffee grown in the North and South Kona districts on
the island of Hawaii. 10 2 The Kona coffee statute, however, per-
mits a beverage labeled "Kona coffee blend" to contain as little
as 10 percent Kona coffee. 0 3 The Minnesota wild rice statute is
unusual in that it regulates not only geographical indications
but also production methods and the nature of the human labor
used.10 4 Under this statute, wild rice that is produced out of
state or cultivated (rather than harvested from a natural lake or
river) must be labeled accordingly.' 0 5 The statute also prohibits
any label suggesting Indian participation in the harvest or
processing of this traditional Indian food unless "the package
contains only 100 percent natural lake or river wild rice har-
vested by Indians." 0 6 These state statutes have limited territo-
rial effect, however, and do nothing to protect importers of
foreign food or beverage products.
98. See id. § 4.25(b).
99. See Wawszkiewicz v. Department of the Treasury, 480 F. Supp. 739,
741-42 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
100. See id. at 742 & n.6; Notice of Informal Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg.
30,517, 30,518 (June 15, 1977) (proposing to raise the old 51 percent limit to 75
percent).
101. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-14-130 to -135 (1986 & Supp. 1995).
102. See HAw. STAT. § 486-120.6 (1991). The state of Hawaii comprises sev-
eral islands, including Oahu, Maui, and the "big island" named Hawaii. See
generally Elizabeth Royte, On the Brink: Hawaii's Vanishing Species, 188:3
NAT'L GEOG. 2, 14-15 (Sept. 1995) (accompanied by a double map supplement
describing the geography and natural history of the Hawaiian islands).
103. See HAw. STAT. § 486-120.6(a)(1)(B) (1991).
104. See MINN. STAT. § 30.49 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
105. See id. § 30.49 subds. 1-2a, 5a.
106. See id. § 30.49 subd. 5.
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Finally, Minnesota's effort to regulate "human factors" by
restricting the commercial use of Indian likenesses in wild rice
marketing may unconstitutionally restrict the right to engage in
commercial speech. As "part of a firm's marketing plan to pro-
vide certain information to the consumer,"10 7 a product label is
constitutionally protected commercial speech.' 08 In 1992, the
BATF approved a malt liquor label using the name and likeness
of Oglala Sioux chief Crazy Horse. The label was widely consid-
ered to be offensive because alcohol consumption is a serious
health problem among American Indians and because Crazy
Horse himself had urged his tribe not to drink alcohol.' 0 9 Con-
gress responded by ordering the BATF to disapprove any label
"which authorizes the use of the name Crazy Horse on any dis-
tilled spirit, wine, or malt beverage product."" 0
A federal court invalidated this statute, holding that the
government had not adequately proved "that the use of a re-
vered Native American name may cause any discernible in-
crease in alcohol consumption among Native Americans.""'
This holding strongly implies that the use of an American In-
dian name or likeness is not inherently misleading. 1 2 Accord-
107. Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), aff'd,
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
108. See generally Coors 115 S. Ct. 1585; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Com'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
109. See Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1229-31
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Confronting the Impact of Alcohol Labeling and Mar-
keting on Native American Health and Culture: Hearing Before the House Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1992)
(reporting high rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related health
problems among native Americans, including an alcoholism rate six times that
of the general population and an incidence of fetal alcohol 'syndrome twenty
times that of the general population).
110. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 633, 106 Stat. 1729 (1992); see also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340A.311 (West Supp. 1995) (banning sales in Minnesota of a "malt li-
quor" whose "brand label states or implies in a false or misleading manner a
connection with an actual living or dead American Indian leader"); cf Trade-
Marks Registrable on Principle Register; Concurrent Registration, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (1994) (prohibiting the registration of a trademark that "[clonsists of
or comprises . . . matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection
with persons, living, or dead,.., or bring them into contempt, or disrepute").
111. See Hornell Brewing Co., 819 F. Supp. at 1237.
112. See id. at 1233-34. Commercial speech that is misleading or that con-
cerns unlawful activity may be freely regulated by the states and the federal
government. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64; cf Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986) (recog-
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ingly, it appears that product marketers in the United States
are presumptively free to exploit names or images associated
with a geographic or ethnically distinct group, and the govern-
ment must prove that any restriction on such commercial speech
directly advances some substantial interest.113
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN
APPELLATIONS OF ORIGIN IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. GEOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC STATUS
All wines qualifying for an AOC under French law may le-
gally use this appellation of origin in the United States.
Whether the right to use the AOC will be exclusive within the
United States is another matter altogether. The ability to ex-
clude others from using a French AOC in the United States is a
question of federal trademark law and state unfair competition
law. Although an American commentator has recently argued
that these laws should protect French AOCs within the United
States,114 these legal strategies hinge on a crucial factual issue:
the extent to which each AOC conveys significant information on
a product's geographic origins or processing. The decisive ques-
tions are, first, whether the typical American consumer associ-
ates a French AOC with a specific French locale and, second,
whether that association materially affects the consumer's
purchasing decision.
1. BATF Rules Concerning Names of Geographic
Significance.
In the viticultural context, the BATF's classification of geo-
graphical indications will probably prove crucial. Under BATF
rules, a name of geographic significance may be generic, semi-
nizing a substantial governmental interest in reducing demand for casino
gambling).
113. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988) (prohibiting the registration of a trade-
mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises ... matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living, or dead,... or bring them into con-
tempt, or disrepute"). In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995),
the Supreme Court invalidated a federal ban on the disclosure of alcoholic con-
tent on beer labels, see 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1988); 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a) (1994),
on the grounds that the ban "makes no rational sense," Coors, 115 S. Ct. at
1592. Nothing in Coors undermines the holding in Hornell; indeed, the
Supreme Court's most recent application of its "commercial speech" doctrine
significantly strengthens advertisers' free speech rights.
114. See Josel, supra note 5, at 495.
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generic, or nongeneric. 115 The BATF describes vermouth and
sake as examples of generic "designations for a class or type of
wine" that have lost their "original[] . . . geographic
significance."' 16
Semi-generic names retain their "geographic significance"
but also serve as "the designation of a class or type of wine."117
They "may be used to designate wines of an origin other than
that indicated by such name only if there appears in direct con-
junction therewith an appropriate appellation of origin disclos-
ing the true place of origin of the wine."118 Such wine must also
"conform[ ] to the standard of identity, if any, for such wine"
under BATF regulations. 119 Alternatively, "if there be no such
standard," the wine must conform "to the trade understanding
of such class or type."120 The BATF lists the following names as
examples of semi-generic designations: Angelica, Burgundy,
Claret, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Malaga, Marsala, Ma-
deira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine, Sauterne, Haut Sauterne,
Sherry, and Tokay.' 21
Finally, the BATF recognizes nongeneric names of geo-
graphic significance. Such a name, however, "shall not be
deemed to be the distinctive designation of a wine unless the
Director [of the BATF] finds that it is known to the consumer
and to the trade as the designation of a specific wine of a partic-
ular place or region, distinguishable from all other wines."1
22
Nondistinctive, nongeneric names are the equivalent under
American law of a geographical indication; they "may be used
only to designate wines of the origin indicated by such
name[s]."' 23 This category includes "American, California, Lake
Erie, Napa Valley, New York State, French, [and] Spanish."124
By contrast, names such as "Bordeaux Blanc" and "Chateau
Yquem" are "distinctive designations of specific grape wines." 125
French AOC wines thus fall into one of two categories under
BATF rules. Many French AOCs are regarded as distinctive,
nongeneric geographic designations. It is hard to imagine how
115. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (1994).
116. Id. § 4.24(a)(2).
117. Id. § 4.24(b)(1).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 4.24(b)(2).
122. Id. § 4.24(c)(1).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 4.24(c)(2).
125. Id. § 4.24(c)(3).
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the BATF rules on appellations of origin and geographic desig-
nations can permit any winemaker who has not complied with
French law to use the French AOC within the American market.
On the other hand, some of the most celebrated French AOCs -
among them burgundy, chablis, and champagne - fall into the
BATF's semi-generic category. Nothing in the BATF rules stops
an American winemaker from selling "California champagne"
that uses a mixture of grapes - say, seventy-five percent from
California, fifteen percent from New York, and ten percent from
Virginia - and follows the mithode champenoise for producing
a sparkling wine. Adherence to the mthode champenoise is
guaranteed; the geographic origin of the grapes and the idea
that champagne should be bottled in Champagne are not.
2. Trademarks and Generic Trade Names.
The ultimate question of exclusive rights to the trade name
"chablis" or "champagne" depends on federal and state trade-
mark law. In turn, both bodies of law depend on a critical fact:
whether a trade name has become generic in the United States.
If a French AOC has become generic, neither a French vintner
nor the INAO can block an American competitor from register-
ing a trademark that incorporates that appellation of origin. 126
In Institut National des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners
International Co., 12 7 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office al-
lowed an American company to register a trademark for "Cha-
blis with a Twist," further labeled as "California White Wine
with Natural Citrus."128 Vintners' label fully complied with the
relevant BATF regulations. 129 INAO opposed the registration,
arguing that it violated two provisions of the federal Lanham
Act of 1946.130 First, section 2(e)(2) of the Lanham Act prohibits
the registration of a mark, which "when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically...
deceptively misdescriptive of them."131 A mark is primarily geo-
graphically deceptively misdescriptive under section 2(e)(2) if
two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the primary significance of the
126. There is no real question that the INAO may represent the interests of
French vintners and cheese makers in the United States. See Institut National
des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1579-80 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
127. 958 F.2d 1574 (Fed.Cir. 1992).
128. Id. at 1576 & n.3.
129. Id. at 1577.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1994).
131. Id. § 1152(e)(2).
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mark as used is a generally known geographic place, and (2) the
public makes a critical "goods/place association" in that it "be-
lieve[s] that the goods . . .originate in that place." 13 2 Federal
courts stress the word "primarily" to ensure that the statute
does not obstruct registration of marks whose geographic mean-
ing is "minor, obscure, remote, or unconnected with the
goods." 133 The INAO also argued that registration of Vintners'
"deceptive" mark would violate section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act.'3 4 A violation of section 2(a) may be established by show-
ing, first, that a mark is primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive under section 2(e)(2), and second, that the geo-
graphic misrepresentation is material to the decision to
purchase the goods so marked.135
The Federal Circuit held that neither section 2(e)(2) nor sec-
tion 2(a) barred the registration of the "Chablis with a Twist"
mark. The Patent and Trademark Office and the court alike
ruled that the word "chablis" in the United States is the com-
mon, descriptive name for a type of wine.' 3 6 The court held that
INAO had "failed to establish whether [American] ... consum-
ers of wine and wine products[ ] would perceive . . .the term
'Chablis' to indicate that the product came from the Chablis re-
gion of France."137 Nor did INAO present any evidence that the
geographic association, even if present, would be a factor in con-
sumer decisions to buy Vintner's "Chablis with a Twist" prod-
uct. 138 Drawing support from the BATF's classification of
"Chablis" as a semi-generic geographic designation for wine, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the word "Chablis" was "generic
and, therefore, in the public domain."139
According to the Vintners court, "the term 'Chablis' [is not]
used in the United States as anything other than a generic name
for a type of wine with certain general characteristics." 40 In the
absence of consumer surveys or other evidence to the contrary,
132. In re Societ6 G6ndrale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel, S.A., 824 F.2d 957,
959 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 767 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98-99 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
133. Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99.
134. Vintners, 958 F.2d at 1575.
135. See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re
House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 53, 56-57 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd.
1983).
136. See 958 F.2d at 1578, 1581.
137. Id. at 1581.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1582.
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the same is almost surely true of other French AOCs that the
BATF has classified as semi-generic. For instance, burgundy,
the English translation of the French AOC "Bourgogne," is so far
removed from its original geographic meaning that it denotes a
deep shade of red. 141 Similar fates have befallen champagne
and claret (a Spanish wine). 142 Chablis and sauterne have
joined burgundy and champagne as words designating not only
a specific wine from France, but also any other wine sharing the
general characteristics of French wines produced under a spe-
cific AOC. 143 In their generic or semigeneric senses, these words
are frequently coupled with a term designating their actual ori-
gin; thus, "California claret" or "New Zealand claret" are com-
mon and perfectly acceptable locutions in the American
language.14 4 If a competing mark "as a whole" is not "perceived
by consumers in [the United States] to be the name of a place
where the ... product originates or is produced," there can be no
protection of a foreign appellation of origin under American
law.145
Ironically, some of the most celebrated AOCs are the likeli-
est designations to be found generic. This should not be espe-
cially surprising; the more successful a trade name, the likelier
it is to attract imitators and to overwhelm the original pro-
ducer's ability to fend off infringers. By virtue of their own suc-
cess, the French wines and cheeses most familiar to the
American public - Burgundy, Chablis, Champagne, Sauterne,
Camembert, Roquefort - are the likeliest to be declared generic
designations by the courts of the United States. These products
may already have gone the way of the hamburger, frankfurter,
and wiener - foods of German or Austrian origin so thoroughly
imitated in the United States that their names have been incor-
141. See WEBSTER'S TmID NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARY 299 (4th ed.
1976) (defining burgundy as "a variable color averaging a dark grayish reddish
brown that is redder and slightly stronger than carbuncle and redder and duller
than average brown mahogany" or "a blackish purple that is redder and less
strong than average eggplant").
142. See id. at 372 (defining champagne as "a pale orange yellow to light
grayish yellowish brown"); id. at 415 (defining claret as "a moderate red that is
slightly lighter than cerise, lighter than Harvard crimson... , very slightly
bluer and paler than average strawberry .... bluer and lighter than Turkey
red, and bluer and stronger than pepper red").
143. See id. at 368 (chablis), 2019 (sauterne).
144. Id. at 415.
145. Vintners, 958 F.2d at 1581.
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porated into the American language and the foods themselves
are now considered stereotypically "American" cuisine. 146
The surest way to lose the battle over AOCs in the United
States is to rely on lawyers rather than marketing experts. In
the skirmish over "Chablis with a Twist," the INAO gravely
erred by "rel[ying] heavily, if not exclusively," on an argument
that French law and BATF regulations establish the crucial
goods-place relationship "as a matter of law."147 Even a sympa-
thetic American commentator has conceded that INAO "should
not simply assume that which needs to be proven"148 - the link
in the consumer's mind between a geographically descriptive
name and the full panoply of natural and human factors associ-
ated with that name. In France, AOCs do so by force of law and
longstanding social custom. In the United States, neither cul-
ture nor positive law gives any meaning to many AOCs, and
France should not expect to win legal protection for geographical
indications that mean nothing to the American consumer.149
The fight for AOCs is an exclusively nonlegal struggle: in
this fight over the way in which Americans eat, drink, and talk,
the decisive factors will be commercial, cultural, and linguistic
- not legal. Though perhaps harsh, this conclusion is consis-
tent not only with the international legal principle of territorial-
ity' 50 but also with the commercial realities of the American
food and beverage market. If the defenders of French AOCs
hope to enjoy greater success in American courts, they would do
well to adopt the thoroughly American habit of waging trade-
mark litigation through consumer surveys and the testimony of
marketing experts.' 51 To be sure, the resulting battle of experts
146. In fact, the words hamburger and frankfurter are frequently shortened
to burger and frank and thereby even further removed from their original geo-
graphic significance. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 127, at 298 (burger), 903 (frank, in its eleventh sense).
147. Vintners, 958 F.2d at 1580.
148. Josel, supra note 5, at 486.
149. The contrary strategy in the Vintners litigation effectively presumed
that Americans share French expectations regarding wine, cheese, and other
fine foods. Libertg, 6galit, .... and cultural imperialism.
150. See generally, e.g., Friedrich-Karl Beier, La territorialitg du droit des
marques et les dchanges internationaux, 98 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
5, 16-17 (1971); A. David Demiray, Intellectual Property and the External Power
of the European Community: The New Extension, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187, 209-
11 (1994).
151. See generally Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in
Trademark Litigation, 19 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 471 (1989); Jack P. Lipton,
Trademark Litigation: A New Look at the Use of Social Science Evidence, 29
AiZ. L. REv. 639 (1987).
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may be confusing and ungratifying, 152 and virtually no "con-
sumer survey research" can overcome the fact "that people are
more careful when they are laying out their money than when
they are answering questions." 153 Warts and all, however, this
is the American legal system at its finest, and French litigants
must play by the rules of our game in order to win.
B. AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
In lamenting the United States' failure to protect French
AOCs, an American commentator has concluded: "What is
needed is not a uniform wine labeling law that imposes one set
of rules on all countries, but rather an agreement not to allow
one nation's system to dilute or undercut the integrity of an-
other's." 5 4 Two such agreements already exist. The coming
years will test whether international law can require American
courts to modify their treatment of foreign AOCs.
Through a bilateral exchange of letters, the United States
has agreed to honor the French AOCs Cognac and Armagnac in
exchange for reciprocal French treatment of Bourbon and Bour-
bon Whisky.' 5 5 By the terms of these letters, an American com-
pany may not call its product "California cognac" or "cognac-
style liqueur, made in the USA." Disclosure of the product's ac-
tual origin does not cure the infringement of the French AOC.
Besides their obviously limited scope, these letters might be con-
strued as evidence that other AOCs should not receive similar
legal protection in the United States. "Expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius":'56 if France needs a special accord to secure this
sort of protection for some of its AOCs in the United States,
other French AOCs by implication are not protected against
competing products that exploit the terms "type" or "style" or
whose labels disclose their true origin.
A more recent and vastly more important source of interna-
tional legal obligations emerged from the recently concluded
152. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football
Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.); Olympia
Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 382 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.).
153. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416.
154. Josel, supra note 5, at 495.
155. See Romain Prot, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6) (citing 12 d~cembre
1970, 18 janvier 1971, D 71-448 du 11 juin 1971 (J.O. 16 juin)).
156. E.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordina-
tion Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993).
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Uruguay Round of world trade talks. The Uruguay Round
yielded not only a new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 157 but also a specific Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).158 TRIPS now re-
quires its member states to offer special protection to
geographical indications recognized under other Members'
laws. 159 The wide-ranging TRIPS accord represents the only re-
alistic means by which to enforce foreign geographical indica-
tions in the United States, a country that has virtually no
commercially valuable appellations of origin and therefore noth-
ing to gain from joining specific international agreements such
as the Str6sa Convention 160 or the Arrangement of Lisbon.' 6 '
As a political matter, it will be easier to convince the United
States that affording greater protection to foreign geographical
indications under TRIPS will be offset by other terms more
favorable to American commercial interests, such as the require-
ment that all Members "provide for the protection of plant vari-
eties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by
any combination thereof."' 62 To the extent that France hopes to
win fuller recognition of its AOC system in "powerful countries
such as the United States," 63 those hopes rest on TRIPS.
TRIPS provides generally that its "Members shall provide
the legal means for interested parties" to protect geographical
indications.' 64 It defines a geographical indication as those
"which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Mem-
ber, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given qual-
ity, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin."' 65 Notably, TRIPS' defi-
nition of a geographical indication omits the "human factors" so
vital to the French and European definition of an AOC; "the con-
nection between natural and human factors has disap-
157. GATT, supra note 6.
158. TRIPS, supra note 6.
159. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 22-24.
160. Convention de Strdsa, D. n 52-663 du 6 juin 1952 (J.O. 11 et 20 juin)
(Aus.-Belg.-Den.-Fr.-It.-Nor.-Neth.-Swed.-Switz.) (protecting appellations of or-
igin and other geographical indications for cheese).
161. Lisbon Arrangement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
Their International Registration, adopted on October 31, 1958, and revised at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, reprinted in MARSHALL LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 278 (1990).
162. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27.3(B).
163. Romain Prot, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2) ("les pays puissants comme
les USA").
164. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 22.2.
165. Id. art. 22.1.
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peared."166 By simplifying and enlarging the concept of an AOC
into a catch-all "geographical indication," TRIPS considerably
weakens the jurisprudential underpinnings of the AOC sys-
tem. 167 TRIPS protects the use of a commercially meaningful
geographical indication, but not the quality-control factors and
exclusive production rights that have enabled the holders of
French AOCs to segment and thereby to dominate that nation's
wine and cheese markets. 168
Nevertheless, TRIPS does seem to provide relatively far-
reaching remedies against infringement of geographical indica-
tions. The accord bans "the use of any means in the designation
or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good
in question originates in a geographical area other than the true
place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the
geographical origin of the good." 169 It also requires a Member to
"refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark" that vio-
lates this legal standard. 170 TRIPS extends "additional protec-
tion for geographical indications for wines and spirits."171 These
indications are to be protected "even where the true origin of the
goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used in
translation or accompanied by expressions such as 'kind,' 'type,'
'style,' 'imitation' or the like."17 2 Already, American commenta-
tors are reading this provision as the end for products marked
"'Champagne-style' sparkling wine or 'California Port.' "173
This conclusion may be somewhat premature. The GATT
giveth, and the GATT taketh away. Three key exceptions
weaken TRIPS' protection of geographical indications. 74 First,
competing uses of geographical indications that have lasted at
166. Romain Prot, supra note 4 (manuscript at 10) ("la conjontion facteurs
naturels-facteurs humains a disparu").
167. See id.
168. See Louis Lorvellec, GATT, agriculture et environnement, 234 REVUE DE
DROiT RURAL 284, 291-92 (June/July 1995).
169. TRIPS, supra note 6, art 22.2(a).
170. Id. art. 22.3.
171. Id. art. 23.
172. Id. art. 23.1.
173. Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 18, 30 (1994).
174. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 24.4-24.6. Other exceptions are fairly
insignificant for the purposes of this discussion. There is little likelihood that
INAO would wait five years before attacking an alleged infringement of an AOC
in the United States. See id. art. 24.7. Moreover, since French law prevents an
AOC from falling into the public domain, the TRIPS exception for "geographical
indications which are not or cease to be protected in their country of origin" is
inapplicable. Id. art. 24.9.
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least ten years before April 15, 1994, are exempted from the ac-
cord. 175 Second, trademarks which are secured in good faith
before the accord takes effect in a member state or "before the
geographical indication is protected in its country of origin" need
not be invalidated. 176 Presumably the "Chablis with a Twist"
trademark at issue in the Vintners litigation would be permitted
to stand. Finally and most significantly, TRIPS provides that:
[n]othing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions
in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with re-
spect to goods or services for which the relevant indication is identical
with the term customary in common language as the common name for
such goods or services in the territory of that Member.177
Likewise, there is no protection for any geographical indication
that is "identical with the customary name of a grape variety
existing in the territory of [a] Member."' 78 Unlike the Madrid
Agreement, nothing in TRIPS indicates that this determination,
effectively a legal ruling that a geographical indication has be-
come generic in a particular jurisdiction, should be performed
outside a member state's courts or by reference to any law other
than that of the member state.
This final exception is so expansive that it virtually elimi-
nates any practical effect on American commercial practice or on
the operation of American law. "Champagne" and "port" are
precisely the types of geographical indications that are "identi-
cal with the term[s] customary in common language as the com-
mon name[s]" of wines, cheeses, and other foods in the United
States. Within the United States, the BATF, the Patent and
Trademark Office, and the Federal Circuit have all concluded
that "Chablis" is a more or less generic name for a white wine
with certain characteristics. Nothing in TRIPS requires Ameri-
can legal institutions to revisit or rethink this conclusion.
If anything, TRIPS reinforces American law's reliance on
the expectations of the ordinary consumer. In the United States
as in the rest of the world, wine connoisseurs will know that
Chablis comes from grapes grown in a delimited region roughly
260 kilometers southeast of Paris and that Chablis farmers
oversee the fermentation of Chablis grapes into Chablis wine ac-
cording to Chablis-specific oenological guidelines. The ordinary
wine-chugging philistine knows nothing of the sort. In this re-
spect, TRIPS accomplishes nothing. The connoisseur hardly
175. See id. art. 24.4.
176. Id. art. 24.5.
177. Id. art. 24.6.
178. See id.
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needs an international treaty to tell her what she already
knows: the AOC indication on the label of a French wine guaran-
tees a certain savor and satisfaction. The ordinary consumer, on
the other hand, has no such knowledge, and American law as
reinforced by TRIPS will take no steps to educate her.
C. LEGAL AND CULTURAL HOSTILITY TO APPELLATIONS OF
ORIGIN
The very idea of an AOC is alien to American law and Amer-
ican culture. If the AOC is a characteristically French or even
European legal concept, it makes a very poor export. As a juris-
prudential concept, the AOC does not weather the high seas and
stormy conditions of global trade. The French should bear in
mind that American intellectual property law has only recently
and begrudgingly begun to accept the French notion of "droit
moral," or moral rights. In a legal system whose constitution
forbids the granting of perpetual patents and copyrights,179 the
indestructible appellation of origin has little chance of finding a
warm reception. American intellectual property law is designed
to maximize dissemination of knowledge through expansion of
the public domain and minimized grants of proprietary protec-
tion. The United States has long favored a positive law theory of
intellectual property over a natural law theory, 80 emphasizing
the "limited" nature of "monopoly privileges" as a necessary
evil' 81 over the putatively natural birthright of the inventor to
prevent others from reaping where she has sown.18 2 Far from
rewarding "hard work" for its own sake, American law denies
proprietary protection for mere ideas and facts so that new en-
trants in the creative marketplace may "sav[e] time and effort by
relying upon the facts contained in prior works." 83 No one can
deny the artistic accomplishment of the farmers who developed
the winemaking methods often associated with Champagne.
Once uprooted from Champagne soil, however, those methods
travel the world as readily as do the wine bottles. Neither do-
179. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (confining congressional power over
patents and copyrights to grants "for limited Times").
180. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1965).
181. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984).
182. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
239-40 (1918); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 166-96 (1992).
183. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352, 354
(1991).
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mestic nor international law prevents late-arriving but enter-
prising winemakers from using either the methods or the
generic trade name of those French farmers.
The symbolically powerful battery of agricultural legislation
enacted in 1862 shows the stark contrast between the legal ap-
proaches to agricultural knowledge in France and in the United
States. The 1862 statutes, passed during the height of the Civil
War, represent the intellectual core of American agricultural
law.184 The Homestead Act of 1862185 typified the United
States' historical willingness to use its abundance of land to at-
tract fresh labor, without regard to the link between the land
and its "human factors." How could there be any expectation
that the land served as a repository of agricultural and culinary
culture when the federal government had spent much of its first
seventy-five years conquering new territories and purging them
of indigenous inhabitants and rival colonizers?' 8 6
American law envisions a different means for propagating
agricultural knowledge: the network of agricultural universities
endowed by the Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862.187 The
expectation that these universities would pump their discoveries
directly into the public domain remains so strong that American
policymakers continually debate whether these universities
should be able to patent their discoveries.' 8 8 Finally, the 1862
statute establishing the United States Department of Agricul-
184. See generally Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809,
831-33 (1995) (discussing the jurisprudential significance of the 1862 statutes);
Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1261, 1274-75 (1995) (same).
185. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
186. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590-91 (1823)
(Marshall, C.J.) (describing how cultivation rendered '"the country in the imme-
diate neighborhood of [European] agriculturists... unfit for" the Indians, who
followed as "game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests"); LAURA INGALLS
WILDER, LIrrLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE 237 (1953) ("When white settlers come
into a country, the Indians have to move on. The government is going to move
these Indians farther west .... White people are going to settle all this coun-
try, and we get the best land because we get there first and take our pick.");
Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; Or, "How the West Was
Really Won," 34 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9-12 (1991) (describing homesteading as a
means for attracting white settlers who would then help defend the United
States' property interests against hostile Indians).
187. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 301-308).
188. Compare Chris Minion, Publicly Funded Scientific Entrepreneurs Are
Entitled to Profit from Their Discoveries, 1991 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 186
with Ammon Goldworth, Publicly Funded Scientific Entrepreneurs Are Not En-
titled to Profit from Their Discoveries, 1991 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 192.
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ture ordered that body "to acquire and to diffuse among the peo-
ple of the United States useful information on subjects
connected with agriculture.., in the most general and compre-
hensive sense of those words, and to procure, propagate, and dis-
tribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants." 89
These statutes express a shared attitude about the nature of
agricultural knowledge. By the terms of the French philosopher
Alain's famous dichotomy,' 90 the American legal vision of agri-
culture assumes that the "nature" inherent in the land can be
freely severed from the "culture" embodied in the human contri-
bution to agriculture. If an agricultural or culinary practice can
be reduced to paper, deposited at the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, taught in a land-grant college classroom, or spread through
the Agricultural Extension Service, American law is prepared to
facilitate the idea's widest dissemination, without regard to its
geographical or cultural provenance. This separation of land-
based and knowledge-based factors in food production undoubt-
edly arose during "the evolution of an agriculture based on an
abundance of land and a relative scarcity of labor."19 ' Certain
natural factors may be bound to the land, but human factors
such as labor and know-how are as transportable as the seeds
that have made the Americas the world's biological clearing-
house since 1492.192 Thus, in France the earth-bound AOC is
given permanent legal life, whereas American courts routinely
conclude that defining agriculture by reference to "land has no
legal or economic validity." 93
IV. AMERICA IS ONE TOUGH CUSTOMER
In a predominantly Protestant country whose notions of
food quality embrace neither "service" nor "satisfaction," whose
signature cheese is a bland corruption of English cheddar and
Colby, the AOC is a hard sell, both legally and commercially.
Most American consumers are blissfully ignorant of the way in
which AOCs and other geographical indications express complex
linkages between the territorial origins of food products and the
human contribution to their refinement. Neither American law
189. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, § 1, 12 Stat. 387 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2201).
190. See generally ALAIN, supra note 10.
191. Ruttan, supra note 27, at 1100.
192. See generally ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGI-
CAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1492 (1972).
193. National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 847 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting).
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nor the United States' international legal obligations will com-
pel any changes in this longstanding consumer attitude.
The United States as a profitable but merciless commercial
arena sheds harsh light on appellations of origin. There is noth-
ing mystical about the AOC system or the products it protects.
Avant-garde medical science has demystified the much bal-
lyhooed and envied "French paradox" - the perception that the
French have deflected much of the cardiovascular damage that
ordinarily attends a diet rich in cholesterol and saturated fat by
consuming red wine, preferably from France (or at least from
one of its winemaking neighbors in Mediterranean Europe). It
turns out that any reduction in the risk of coronary heart dis-
ease is attributable to ethanol, not constituents unique to wine,
red wine, or French red wine. 194 Moderate alcohol intake of any
sort will do; Budweiser proves as effective as Burgundy in ward-
ing off myocardial infarctions.
Appellations of origin must survive the dual acid tests of sci-
ence and economics. In a world of free trade, scientifically un-
justified or unjustifiable assertions regarding nature are more
often than not the accomplices of economic self-dealing. The
Court of Justice of the European Communities recognized as
much in invalidating a German appellation of origin linked to
nothing more than a requirement that the vineyards and finish-
ing facilities in question be found on German territory. 195 A
similar instinct animates the Uruguay Round's Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which
demands that all measures "necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health [be] based on scientific principles" and jus-
tified by "sufficient scientific evidence."196 Science, not mystery,
is the new legal currency of world trade.
Likewise, it is time to demystify the legal apparatus that
underlies French appellations of origin. French law's vaunted
connection between natural and human factors is a smokescreen
for normatively debatable decisions on rural development and
industrial policy. As Professor Lorvellec concedes in his re-
194. See J. Michael Gaziano et al., Alcohol Beverage Type, HDL and Risk of
Myocardial Infarction, 92:8 CIRCULATION 1-800 (Oct. 15, 1995) (abstract no.
3847); Yasuyuki Nakamura et al., Moderate Alcohol Intake and Outcome After
an Acute Coronary Event, 92:8 CIRCULATION (Oct. 15, 1995) (abstract no. 3402).
It bears remembering that "heavy alcohol intake increases total mortality."
Gaziano, supra, at 1-800.
195. Case 12-74, Commission/Germany, the affair of "Sekt" and "Wein-
brand," CJCE Feb. 20, 1975.
196. S.P.S. ACCORD ART. 2.2
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sponse to this Article, the French AOC system and the analo-
gous AOP system within the European Union are "measures of
the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] and not.., laws aimed
at consumer protection." 197 The link with the CAP, the notori-
ously expensive and unwieldy program of agricultural subsidies
that has become "the most important ... policy" of the European
Union "in terms of the number of people directly affected, its
share of the [Union's] Budget and the extent of the powers
transferred from national to European level," 198 exposes the
true nature of appellations of origin. The AOC is designed pri-
marily to maximize producer incomes and only secondarily, if at
all, to protect consumer expectations.
Even if one contests the widespread evidence that some of
the most famous AOCs have become generic trade names in the
United States, it makes little sense to focus on a disputed AOC's
"geographic significance" to the consumer as the sign's "intended
recipient" without also considering the French contribution to
the "lapsing" of French producers' rights.199 AOCs lie at the
heart of an elaborate scheme to secure exclusive production
rights and a desirable return on incumbent farmers' entrepre-
neurship. After centuries of common commercial usage in the
United States, all unchecked by French interests, Champagne
and Chablis are on the verge of going the way of the hamburger,
the frankfurter, and the Swedish meatball. As the primary (and
perhaps the exclusive) beneficiaries of the AOC system, produ-
cers properly bear the onus of staving off the accelerating down-
ward slide toward generic status for the most celebrated AOCs.
Finally, Professor Lorvellec's argument that AOCs "favor
the preservation of the environment" merits at least a Parthian
volley, if not a fully developed response.200 This survey of appel-
lations of origin provides neither the time nor the place for dis-
cussing the dramatic scope and harmful impact of the numerous
"agroecological fallacies" that pervade American and European
agricultural policy.20 ' For the moment it suffices to note that
197. Lorvellec, supra note 36, at 212.
198. TIMOTHY BAINBRIDGE & ANTHONY TEASDALE, THE PENGUIN COMPANION
TO EUROPEAN UNION 48 (1995).
199. Lorvellec, supra note 36, at 75.
200. Id. at 77.
201. For more extensive discussions of these agroecological fallacies, see Jim
Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and
Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 1996); Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out:
Decoupling Environmental from Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regula-
tion, 48 OKLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
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this defense of AOCs falls victim to the biggest agroecological
fallacy of them all: forgetting that "[flarming is not an environ-
mentally benign activity."20 2 Professor Lorvellec's legitimate
concern with agricultural overproduction would be more effec-
tively redirected toward reform of France's statut du fermage et
mgtayage (Law of Tenant Farming and Sharecropping). 203 The
French tenant farmer's obligation to keep rented land in agricul-
tural production and to maximize harvests20 4 is attracting in-
creasingly close scrutiny as a source of trouble in French
agricultural policy. 20 5 Environmentally speaking, relatively lit-
tle hinges on the performance of French wines in foreign liquor
stores and restaurants and the performance of French AOCs in
foreign courts. It simply stretches credulity to imagine that the
fate of the French environment depends on Champagne vint-
ners' share of the global market for sparkling wines.
These normative defenses of French AOCs invite a larger
debate over agricultural policy, a debate that defies easy resolu-
tion. Regardless of the outcome of that debate, this much is
clear: TRIPS and the AOC system have reached an uneasy stale-
mate. In this unstable legal milieu, what are French parties
who are interested in protecting their AOC system to do? For
the moment, perhaps INAO should spend less time litigating
losing causes in American courts and more time on marketing.
That, at any rate, is the clear message of the Vintners litigation
and the TRIPS accord. The American consumer is not entirely
insensitive to the foreign origins of foods; even the hint of an
exotic provenance appeals to the American palette. One of the
greatest American culinary creations is "soup Vichyssoise" (or
"creme vichyssoise glac6e"), invented at the old Ritz-Carlton Ho-
tel in New York City and served throughout the United
States.20 6 For the town of Vichy, granting one's name to a dish
concocted in Manhattan may be the ultimate form of flattery.
For the stakeholders of French AOCs, however, commercial imi-
tation is a particularly costly form of flattery. The remedy lies
not in legal reform, but rather in superior marketing and con-
202. Chen, The American Ideology, supra note 167, at 872.
203. CODE RURAL art. L. 411-1 to 416-9 (Fr.).
204. See id. art. 411-27.
205. See, e.g., Jacques Foyer, Amrnnager le statut du fermage, 233 REVUE DE
DRorr RURAL 246, 247 (May 1995). The statut du fermage takes on great signifi-
cance in light of the growth of tenant farmers in France, who now outnumber
their owner-operator counterparts in French agriculture. See MINISTERE DE
L'AGRICULTURE ET DE LA PPCHE, GRAPH AGRi FRANCE 94, at 13 (1994).
206. See Louis DIAT, GOURMET'S BASIC FRENCH COOKBOOK 27, 59 (1961).
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sumer education. As "le bon La Fontaine" has instructed gener-
ations of French children, "Apprenez que tout flatteur / Vit aux
dgpens de celui qui l'coute."20 7 For the defenders of French
AOCs, "cette legon vaut bien un fromage, sans doute."208
207. JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, FABLES, Le Corbeau et le renard 3 (Cambridge,
John Bartlett, 3d ed.).
208. Id.
Learn that every flatterer
Lives at the flattered listener's cost:
A lesson worth more than the cheese that you lost.
THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE 14 (Marianne Moore trans. 1954).
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